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Abstract:  
Ex-post opportunistic behavior, commonly present in bilateral trade relationships, is a key element of 
the transaction cost economics. Investment in outside options is a prime example of such opportunism and 
often leads to inefficiency, for example by exerting effort to search for alternative business partners even if it 
does not add trade value. We experimentally investigate a bilateral trade relationship in which standard theory 
assuming self-regarding preferences predicts that the seller will be better off by investing in the outside option 
to improve his bargaining position. The seller’s investment, however, might negatively affect the buyer’s 
other-regarding preferences if the investment is viewed as opportunistic. We find overall support for our 
hypotheses that arise from the link between other-regarding behavior and opportunism. Our findings suggest 
that when the transaction cost economics approach is applied to the design of a governance structure, other 
regarding preferences, if relevant, should be taken into account.  
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1. Introduction 
 In bilateral trade relationships, a surplus to be shared between two parties often exists because 
the value of trade within the relationship exceeds the value of outside trading opportunities. The 
surplus, often referred to as appropriable quasi-rents, opens up possibilities for each party to engage 
in socially inefficient rent-seeking activities to increase its share of the pie. These inefficient 
activities are referred to as ex-post opportunistic behavior because they are over appropriable quasi-
rents that have been already created. Ex-post opportunistic behavior is a key element of the 
transaction cost economics view of Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985) and Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian (1978).
1
  
 The focus of our study is on investment in an outside option, which is an important example 
of ex-post opportunistic behavior as pointed out by Klein et al. (1978), and the effect it has on the 
split of appropriable quasi-rents.
2
 In their example of bilateral trade between a printing press 
company and a publisher,  Klein et al. argue that the publisher may decide to hold its own standby 
press facilities (an investment in an outside option) in order to increase its bargaining position 
against the printing press company.
3
 We investigate the effect of investment in an outside option by 
experimentally testing conjectures based on agents’ other-regarding preferences. If agents are selfish 
and care only about their monetary return, investment in outside options will be made whenever the 
monetary return from doing so is positive. It is well known, however, that agents often care for 
others to some degree rather than being completely selfish (see Camerer, 2003 and Cooper and 
Kagel, 2010 for surveys). The presence of other-regarding preferences makes it difficult to predict 
actions that agents take regarding investment in outside options.  
One party’s investment in an outside option may crowd out its trade partner’s other-regarding 
preferences. We experimentally investigate this link by analyzing the following interaction between 
a seller and a buyer. A potential gain from trade between the seller and the buyer, denoted by G, is 
                                                          
1 Ex-post opportunistic behavior leads to ex-post inefficiency. This is significantly different from ex-ante inefficiency, 
the focus of the property-right theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). In the 
property-rights theory, the surplus (appropriable-quasi rents) created by relation-specific investment is shared between 
two parties through efficient bargaining. The surplus-sharing leads to inefficiency in ex-ante investment when contracts 
are incomplete, and the theory studies the roles of asset ownership in mitigating this ex-ante inefficiency. See Whinston 
(2003) and Gibbons (2005) for clear discussions on the differences between the transaction cost economics and the 
property-right theory of the firm. See also Shelanski and Klein (1995) on a survey of empirical research in transaction 
cost economics.  
2
 We refer to outside option as the payoff received if the bargaining is unsuccessful; also referred to as the “disagreement 
payoff” in the literature. 
3
 See also Baker and Hubbard (2004), who analyze the U.S. trucking industry and show that, when a driver owns a truck, 
the truck ownership may encourage the driver to engage in a costly search for alternative hauls, in order to strengthen his 
bargaining position with the dispatcher. Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) study transfer pricing and the organization of trade 
between a selling unit and a buying unit. When the unit managers are allowed to trade with outsiders, they will spend 
resources to improve outside offers in ways that do not contribute to overall efficiency. Cai (2003) also points out that, in 
bilateral trade relationships, a party may want to exert efforts in searching for alternative business partners in order to 
enhance his bargaining position, even if it does not add value to the trade with his partner.  
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available, where G is interpreted as appropriable quasi-rents. First, the seller decides whether to 
invest in an outside option at the cost F in case he later rejects the buyer’s offer. If the seller invests, 
then his outside option is X, where G > X > F. If the seller does not invest, then his outside option is 
0. Next, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer p to the seller to divide the gain G. The buyer gets 
to keep the remainder G – p only if the seller accepts the offer. Finally, the seller learns about the 
offer and decides whether to accept or reject it. If the seller accepts the offer, he receives p and his 
outside option becomes irrelevant in this case. If the seller rejects the offer, he receives the outside 
option of X if he invested, and receives 0 otherwise. The buyer receives 0 after rejection, regardless 
of the investment.
4
 
 Assuming self-regarding preferences, standard economic theory predicts that the seller will 
invest in the outside option if agents care only about their own monetary payoffs. To see this, 
suppose that the seller did not invest at Stage 1. The buyer then offers p = 0, which is accepted by the 
seller. Similarly, if the seller invested at Stage 1, the buyer offers p = X. Anticipating this, the seller 
will invest in the outside option at Stage 1 because X > F. The seller’s investment is opportunistic in 
the sense that it increases the seller’s payoff from 0 to X by effectively reducing the buyer’s payoff 
from G to G – X. The investment is inefficient because it adds no value to the seller’s trade with the 
buyer.  
The transaction cost economics approach to the theory of the firm postulates that this type of 
inefficient opportunistic behavior can be prevented by costly remedies such as vertical integration. 
Then, in our setup, vertical integration between the seller and the buyer, if it is an option, can 
improve efficiency by eliminating the socially inefficient investment F if the transaction cost for 
vertical integration is less than F. 
In reality, however, agents often have fairness concerns and behave in other-regarding ways, 
and hence, say, an altruistic buyer may offer more than the outside option X. The seller’s investment 
in the outside option might have a negative impact on the buyer’s other-regarding behavior if the 
buyer views the investment as opportunistic. The seller’s anticipation of such a negative impact may 
then induce the seller not to invest in the outside option in contrast to the prediction of standard 
economic theory, implying that vertical integration may not be a necessary remedy to prevent the 
seller from taking the inefficient action. 
The connection between other-regarding behavior and ex-post opportunistic behavior can 
therefore yield important implications for the design of a governance structure. This paper attempts 
                                                          
4
 One can also analyze a richer setup in which not only the seller but also the buyer has an option to invest in an outside 
option. We have chosen the current setup for the sake of simplicity of the experimental design. This setup captures the 
strategic incentives where one of the parties can invest in an unproductive activity in order to increase its bargaining 
power. 
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to take a step towards understanding of this link by experimentally investigating conjectures that 
arise in our setup. Our setup allows us to generate insights about considerations relevant for the 
transacting parties when deciding whether to engage in ex-post opportunistic behavior or whether to 
invoke costly remedies to prevent opportunism.  
Consider the case in which the seller invested to establish the outside option of X. When 
dividing gain G, an altruistic buyer may offer more than X, even if the seller accepts any offer 
greater than or equal to X. Let pI  X + Z denote the buyer’s offer following the seller’s investment, 
where Z is a premium price on top of the outside option, resulting from the buyer’s altruistic 
preferences. Next, consider the case when the seller did not invest in the outside option. Let pNI 
denote the buyer’s offer following the seller’s non-investment, where an altruistic buyer may offer 
pNI > 0 even if the seller accepts any non-negative offer. 
We postulate that the buyer views the seller’s investment as opportunistic behavior. The lack 
of investment in an outside option means that the seller chose not to engage in opportunistic behavior 
even though there was a chance to do so. Hence, we postulate that the buyer views non-investment as 
kind behavior. The seller’s (opportunistic) investment thus reduces the degree of the buyer’s altruism 
towards the seller, whereas the seller’s (kind) non-investment increases it. This logic yields two 
conjectures regarding the size of the outside option. First, we conjecture that Z, which is a measure 
of the buyer’s altruism following investment, is decreasing in X. As the level of the outside option 
increases, the buyer views the seller’s investment as increasingly more opportunistic. This reduces 
the buyer’s altruism towards the seller, implying that the buyer offers a lower premium price to the 
seller. Second, we conjecture that pNI, a measure of the buyer’s altruism following non-investment, is 
increasing in X. This second conjecture hinges on the buyer’s perception of non-investment being 
kind behavior, where the degree of perceived kindness increases as the forgone outside option 
increases. This implies that pNI increases as X increases.
5
 
We design a laboratory experiment that allows us to test our conjectures regarding the size of 
the outside option in a basic setup (Experiment 1). In the experiment, we set the gain from trade G = 
100 and implement three treatments in which we exogenously vary the outside option to be X = 25, 
35, and 65. Within this setup, our conjectures regarding Z and pNI yield the following testable 
hypotheses:  
(H1) Z
25
 > Z
35
 > Z
65
 
(H2) pNI
25
 < pNI
35
 < pNI
65
 
                                                          
5
 The derivation of conjectures based on the logic of the Revealed Altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) is 
presented in Appendix A. 
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Our experimental results support the first hypothesis. Regarding the second hypothesis, our data 
support pNI
25
 < pNI
65 
and pNI
35
 < pNI
65 
but do not support pNI
25
 < pNI
35
. 
Our hypotheses and experimental design have a merit of simplicity to study the link between 
other-regarding behavior and investment in outside options as opportunistic behavior. However, they 
have the following limitations. First, the seller’s investment in outside option does not fully convey 
the seller’s opportunism towards the buyer because the seller does not choose the level of X in our 
setup. Hence a seller in the X = 65 treatment, say, can be held responsible for the act of investment in 
this high-valued outside option, but not for the size of the outside option itself. Second, the mere 
presence of the outside option induced by investment changes the bargaining environment. Thus, one 
cannot convincingly conclude the seller’s opportunistic behavior negatively affects the buyer’s other-
regarding preferences as the observed effect could be triggered solely by the corresponding change 
in the environment. 
In light of these limitations, we have undertaken Experiment 2 consisting of two new 
treatments. In the Choice treatment, if the seller chooses to invest in outside option, the seller also 
chooses the value of X from X = 25, 35, or 65. In the Random treatment, the seller makes no 
investment decision. Instead, the computer randomly chooses one of the following four options with 
equal probability: (i) no investment, (ii) investment resulting in X = 25, (iii) investment resulting in 
X = 35, or (iv) investment resulting in X = 65. In both treatments, the seller’s cost of investment is 
fixed at F = 10 as in Experiment 1.  
Buyer’s offers following investment observed in Experiment 1 are replicated for all three 
outside options in the Choice treatment of Experiment 2, suggesting that buyers’ behavior is not 
particularly sensitive to whether the size of the outside option is endogenously chosen by the seller 
or exogenously imposed by the design.
6
 Experiment 2 data show that Z
25
 > Z
35
 > Z
65
 holds in both 
treatments, where Z
25
 > Z
35
 > Z
65
 in the Random treatment is driven by the change in the bargaining 
environment but not by the seller’s opportunistic behavior. The comparison of premium prices 
between the Choice and Random treatments suggests that the buyer views the seller’s investment as 
opportunistic when X = 65, but not when X = 25 or 35. 
Our experiment is designed to study whether in the transaction cost approach to the theory of 
the firm it is important to take into account agents’ other-regarding preferences. From this point of 
view, our experimental findings seem pertinent to buyer-seller relationships between one-person 
firms (e.g., the trucking industry example studied by Baker and Hubbard, 2004). In the contexts of 
larger firms, however, we believe our findings are also applicable to bilateral trade relationships 
                                                          
6
 Regarding replicability it is important to note that Experiment 2 was run in a different laboratory as one of the authors 
moved and the original lab no longer existed. The results are thus robust to two changes made simultaneously.  
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between managers representing different firms. As an example, consider sales of exhaust pipe by a 
sales manager of a steel manufacturing firm (firm S) to a procurement manager of an automobile 
manufacturer (firm A). Although the sales manager knows that firm S’ exhaust pipe is best suited to 
firm A’s automobiles, he may undertake sales activities to other automobile manufacturers to 
establish outside options for his sales negotiations with firm A’s procurement manager. As long as 
each manager’s performance is linked to his compensation, the procurement manager may view the 
establishment of outside options as the sales manager’s opportunistic behavior and his choice of not 
establishing outside options as the sales manager’s kind behavior. However, it is possible that if 
managers act on behalf of their firms rather than on their own, the effects we are studying could be 
muted. 
As with any theory (or theory-testing experiments), our setup is an abstraction zooming in on 
the underlying mechanism that could be driving behavior of buyers and sellers in the described 
scenario. This approach enables us to study the interaction of opportunistic and other-regarding 
behavior while controlling for factors that affect behavior in the field in an uncontrolled manner and 
thus allow us to draw causal inferences about their potential importance in everyday business 
transactions. 
Finally, note that our paper is not the first one to experimentally study the link between 
opportunistic behavior and other-regarding preferences and relate this link to the theory of the firm. 
Oosterbeek, Sloof, and Sonnemans (2011) (referred to OSS hereafter) study a similar link and relate 
it to the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. Their application to the theory of the firm 
is closely motivated by Baker and Hubbard’s (2004) study of the business relationship between a 
truck driver and a dispatcher. Our contribution to the literature is complementary to OSS’s 
contribution because we focus on the transaction cost economics approach, whereas OSS focus on 
the property rights approach (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), to the theory of the 
firm. See Section 2 for similarities and differences between OSS and our paper. 
 
2.  Relationship to the literature  
 The present paper sheds a new light on the transaction cost economics approach to the theory 
of the firm by studying the link between investment in an outside option and other-regarding 
behavior. As mentioned above, our contribution to the literature is related to the contribution of OSS. 
OSS study the link between productive incentives and rent-seeking incentives in a multi-tasking 
environment. In their extension of the trust game, a seller chooses two investment levels, a 
productive one and an unproductive (rent-seeking) one. A buyer then decides how much money to 
transfer back to the seller, where back-transfers should be in between a minimum amount M and the 
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overall surplus S (with M < S). The minimum amount M is assumed to be a weighted average of the 
value of productive investment and the value of rent-seeking investment, where the weight of the 
value of productive investment is interpreted representing the seller’s bargaining power. OSS Find 
that incentive instruments like asset ownership or performance pay become less attractive when the 
scope for rent-seeking activities increases but that reciprocity mitigates the adverse effects of rent-
seeking opportunities. 
 Investment in rent-seeking activity in OSS is analogous to investment in outside option in our 
study in the sense that it is opportunistic. OSS predict that an increase in the minimum amount M 
reduces the bonus that the buyer offers to the seller on top of M. This prediction is similar to our 
prediction that an increase in the outside option X decreases the buyer’s premium price Z. The 
underlying logic, however, is quite different. In OSS, higher M is driven by the seller’s higher 
investment in rent-seeking activity. OSS develop a prediction that the seller’s higher investment, 
which is perceived as unkind by the buyer, results in reduction of the bonus that the buyer offers. In 
our setup, the seller’s investment cost is fixed at F and the seller chooses whether or not to invest in 
outside option. We predict that as the level of outside option increases, the buyer views the seller’s 
investment as increasingly more opportunistic, resulting in the reduction of the premium price that 
the buyer offers.  
 OSS relate their experimental findings to the property rights approach to the theory of the 
firm. The setup of OSS’s model is closely related to Baker and Hubbard (2004), who consider the 
business relation between a truck and a dispatcher in which the driver chooses how much effort to 
expend in productive activities and how much effort to expend in rent-seeking activities. If the driver 
owns the truck, he has stronger incentives for both types of activities. Hence, truck ownership by the 
driver is only optimal if the additional productive incentives outweigh the extra rent-seeking 
incentives. Analogous to this logic, OSS posit that the seller’s ownership of asset increases the 
seller’s bargaining power and the marginal return of his rent-seeking activities. OSS find that 
subjects typically choose higher rent-seeking levels when the marginal returns to rent-seeking 
increase, but the observed increases are much smaller than the levels predicted by standard theory. 
Moreover, the investments in productive activities are typically higher than the levels predicted by 
standard theory and the investments in rent-seeking are usually lower. These experimental findings 
suggest that the efficient ownership structure of asset (to be owned by the seller or by the buyer) in 
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the presence of agents’ reciprocity considerations may be different from the efficient ownership 
structure suggested by standard theory.
7
 
The difference between OSS’ application and our application to the theory of the firm 
parallels the difference between the property rights approach and the transaction cost economics 
approach to the theory of the firm. In OSS, the seller invests in productive activities and rent-seeking 
activities prior to the creation of appropriable quasi-rents, and the ownership structure affects the 
seller’s incentives to invest in both types of activities. Agents’ reciprocity considerations may 
significantly impact the efficient ownership structure in OSS setup. In our setup, the seller can invest 
in outside option in a situation where appropriable quasi-rents have been already created. 
Transaction cost economics postulates that ex-post opportunistic behavior such as the investment in 
outside option can be prevented by vertical integration. We argue that, in the presence of agents’ 
other regarding preferences, the seller may refrain from investing in outside option to avoid 
negatively impacting the buyer, implying that vertical integration may not be a necessary remedy to 
the opportunistic behavior. 
In bilateral trade relationships, relation-specific investment (analogous to productive 
investment in OSS) often creates appropriable quasi-rents to be shared between two parties. The 
surplus-sharing leads to the problem of inefficiency (the holdup problem) in a world of incomplete 
contracts. Several papers have previously studied the holdup problem from behavioral perspectives. 
These papers study agents’ incentives to make relation-specific investments, focusing on the issues 
of communication between parties (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Charness and Dufwenberg, 
2006), private information about alternative opportunities (Sloof, 2008), heterogeneous fairness 
preferences (von Siemens, 2009), the role of contracts (Hoppe and Schmitz, 2011), and the 
possibility of vengeance (Dufwenberg, Smith, and Van Essen, 2013).  
Regarding the interaction between other-regarding preferences and opportunism, Dufwenberg 
et al. (2013) experimentally investigate a behavioral hypothesis that negative reciprocity can mitigate 
an agent’s underinvestment in a holdup setup only when the investor holds the rights to control of the 
investment proceeds, and find supporting experimental evidence. In von Siemens’ (2009) theoretical 
model, sellers have heterogeneous fairness preferences that are private information. Sellers’ 
investments can then signal their preferences, thereby influence beliefs, and bargaining behavior. 
                                                          
7
 For a related experimental paper, see Oosterbeek, Sonnemans, and van Velzen (2003), who study a marriage situation 
in which a spouse who invests in relationship-specific human capital increases the surplus. Such an investment decreases 
her outside option, which might in turn result in underinvestment in relationship-specific human capital. The authors find 
that although underinvestment occurs, it is less frequent than game theory predicts. Unlike unproductive investments in 
OSS, relationship-specific investment decreases the outside option in Oosterbeek, Sonnemans, and van Velzen. 
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Consequently, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is 
unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining. 
These previous studies of the holdup problem are related to our paper in the sense that they 
experimentally study investment inefficiency associated with appropriable-quasi rents. Their focus, 
however, differs from ours as all these previous papers focus on underinvestment in relation-specific 
investment that creates appropriable quasi-rents, which is an ex-ante inefficiency. In contrast, we 
focus on an ex-post inefficiency of investment in outside option that is opportunistic and, from the 
welfare perspective, wasteful. Our contribution is therefore complementary to these earlier papers as 
we study a different aspect of investment inefficiency.  
Our paper bears certain similarity to the relationship between implementation of a minimum 
performance requirement and a worker’s intrinsic motivation studied by Falk and Kosfeld (2006), 
referred to as FK hereafter. In their principal-agent game, an agent chooses a productive activity x, 
which is costly to him but beneficial to the principal. In the experiment, the cost for the agent is x, 
while the benefit to the principal is 2x. Before the agent chooses x, the principal decides whether or 
not to force a minimum requirement x > 0, increasing the lower bound of the agent’s choice set. FK 
find that most agents choose smaller values of x when minimum requirements are enforced. Their 
results suggest that the use of control entails “hidden costs” that should be considered when 
designing employment contracts and workplace environments.  
 The seller’s investment in the outside option in our setup plays a role in a certain sense 
similar to enforcement of a minimum payment requirement. This is because, if the seller invests, the 
buyer may think that he must offer a price at least equal to the outside option, p = X. The 
requirement, however, is indirect because the seller may accept an offer p < X, whereas the 
requirement in FK is direct. Furthermore, investment in outside options is costly, whereas a 
minimum performance requirement is costless in FK. Our focus is to study the aforementioned 
conjectures regarding the link between investment in an outside option and other-regarding behavior, 
whereas the focus in FK is to show that most agents reduce their performance as a response to the 
principal’s control decision. 
The interaction between the buyer and the seller, described in Introduction, is reminiscent of 
the ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982) with an outside option.
8
 Several 
previous experimental studies explore behavior in ultimatum games, in which outside options are 
exogenously given (Sopher, 1993; Knez and Camerer, 1995; Eckel and Gilles, 2004). Eckel and 
Gilles (2004) systematically vary the outside option to the proposer and find that the amount kept by 
                                                          
8
 See also Camerer (2003), van Damme et al. (2014), and Güth and Kocher (2014) for excellent surveys of behavior 
observed in the ultimatum game. 
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the proposer increases with the size of the outside option available to him. This finding lends 
empirical support to the intuition that having an outside option increases the respective party’s 
material payoff.
 9
 The fundamental difference between our Experiment 1 and the previous studies is 
that the presence of outside option is endogenously established by the seller’s investment decision in 
our Experiment 1 while its size is exogenously varied by the experimental design. This set up allows 
us to study new hypotheses based on the postulation that the buyer views the seller’s investment as 
opportunistic behavior whereas non-investment is viewed as kind. By exogenously varying the size 
of the outside option we are able to test our hypothesis (H2) that with the size of the outside option 
increasing, the buyer views non-investment as increasingly more kind. Furthermore, in Experiment 2 
we compare the Choice and Random treatments, where the latter treatment is similar to the setup in 
the previous studies in the sense that the level of outside option is not chosen by subjects. 
 
3.  Experiment 1: The size of the outside option imposed by design 
 The objective of Experiment 1 is to investigate the link between investment in outside 
options and other-regarding behavior in a basic setting. When calibrating our experiment, we relied 
on the previous findings from the ultimatum bargaining literature. Camerer (2003), who surveys the 
literature on ultimatum games, states that, on average, the proposers offer between 30-40 percent of 
the pie, and offers of 40-50 percent are rarely rejected. Offers below 20 percent or so are rejected 
about half the time (p. 49). Based on these results, we chose to implement three treatments in which 
we vary the outside option to be X = 25, 35, and 65 tokens. 25 percent of the total pie is below the 
average offer and 35 percent is about average. 65 percent, on the other hand, represents a significant 
portion (almost two-thirds) and the change is likely to trigger the behavioral response that we set out 
to study. We decided to include the above three treatments in order to test for robustness of our 
findings with respect to small and large changes in the outside option. Since ex ante it is not clear 
whether and how the studied link between opportunism and other-regarding preferences depends on 
the actual size of X, including only two values of X, say 35 and 65, would not allow us to detect 
possible non-monotonicity in the above relationship. 
 
                                                          
9
 Sopher (1993) uses a “random ultimatum game” to compare subject behavior in a treatment where both players have 
the same positive outside option to a treatment where only one player has a positive outside option. Surprisingly, he finds 
that it is the players with lower outside option who demand a larger share of the pie. Sopher’s result is likely to be driven 
by the fact that the players simultaneously act both as proposers and receivers with the payoff-relevant scenario being 
determined randomly. Knez and Camerer (1995) also employ exogenous outside options to study social comparisons 
between two responders with different outside options in a situation when the responders receive proposals from a single 
respondent. Their data show that responders reject offers more frequently when they are offered less than the other 
responder.  
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Experiment 1 took place in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory (NZEEL) 
at the University of Canterbury, with 202 undergraduate students serving as subjects. The 
participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment involved an across-
subjects design in which each subject only participated in a single session (and thus a single 
treatment) of the study. All sessions were run under a single-blind social distance protocol, meaning 
there was full anonymity between the participants; the experimenters, however, could track subjects’ 
decisions and identities. An experimental session lasted 60 minutes on average, including the initial 
instruction period and the payment of subjects. The experiment was programmed and conducted with 
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The subjects earned an average of NZD 17.61 (New 
Zealand dollars) including a NZD 5 show up fee.  
Upon entering the laboratory, all participants were seated in cubicles. Neutrally framed 
instructions (provided in the Appendix B) were handed out, projected on a screen, and read aloud. 
The subjects were informed that their earnings would be denoted in experimental currency units, 
referred to as tokens, and at the end of the experiment exchanged into New Zealand dollars using the 
following exchange rate: 1 token = NZD 0.30, with the actual earnings rounded up; this was 
announced to subjects individually during the payment. The instructions explained that each 
participant would be randomly and anonymously paired with another person and that within each 
pair, one person was going to be randomly assigned to be the seller (in the subject instructions 
referred to as the ‘First Mover’) and the other person to be the buyer (the ‘Second Mover’). The 
seller started the experiment with an endowment of 10 tokens and the buyer with 0 tokens.   
The decisions were divided into three stages. In Stage 1, the seller had to decide whether to 
invest his 10 tokens in order to create an outside option of X tokens for himself in case he later 
rejected the buyer’s offer made in Stage 2.10 If the seller invested, then his outside option was X 
tokens. If the seller did not invest, then his outside option was 0 tokens, but he got to keep the initial 
10 tokens. In Stage 2, 100 tokens were made available to be split between the pair. The buyer 
decided how much out of 100 tokens (in integer amounts) to offer to the seller. The buyer got to keep 
the remainder only if the seller accepted the offer. We used the strategy method (Selten, 1967) to 
elicit the buyer’s behavior. Therefore, the buyer was not notified of the seller’s investment decision 
until the end of the experiment and made an offer for both of the two possible scenarios, i.e., one if 
the seller had invested and his outside option was X tokens and the other if the seller had not 
invested and his outside option was 0 tokens. Brandts and Charness (2011) survey the studies 
comparing the strategy method with the direct-response method and find that in a vast majority the 
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 Keeping the cost of investment fixed allows us to maintain the decision-making environment fixed across treatments 
and focus solely of the effect of the size of the outside option. 
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strategy method and the direct-response method induce similar results. The advantage of the strategy 
method is that it also allows for obtaining decisions at nodes that are not reached in the actual course 
of play. If, however, one expected the elicitation procedure to influence behavior in our setup, the 
strategy method is likely to yield weaker effects (unless coupled with a within-subject design which, 
however, is not the case here) as it elicits behavior in the “cold emotional state” (Brandts and 
Charness, 2000), making the current design a conservative test of our conjectures.  
The two scenarios were presented to each buyer by the software in a random order. In Stage 
3, the seller learned about the offer (either following investment or non-investment, depending on his 
own Stage 1 decision) and decided whether to accept it or reject it. If the seller accepted the buyer’s 
offer, the 100 tokens were split according to the offer and the seller’s outside option was irrelevant in 
this case. If the seller rejected the buyer’s offer, the buyer received 0 tokens. The seller received the 
outside option of X tokens if he had invested in Stage 1, and received 0 tokens if he had not 
invested.
11
 
The parameterization of the game is presented in Figure 1. This game tree was not shown to 
the subjects. The experiment was one-shot. 
In order to minimize confusion in the minds of subjects in this three-stage game, we opted to 
include four control questions, which all participants had to answer correctly before proceeding to 
the decision-making part. While the subjects were answering the control questions, the experimenter 
privately answered any questions and, if necessary, provided additional assistance and explanation 
until the subject calculated all answers correctly. (There were a few subjects who required multiple 
explanations until they answered the questions correctly; however, no subjects were excluded from 
participating). Then, the four scenarios were reviewed publicly by the experimenter and correct 
answers projected on the screen. Finally, during the decision-making part, the buyers had on their 
screens a calculator that would display their own as well as their paired seller’s payoffs following 
acceptance and rejection of any offer they decided to input. At the end of the session, the subjects 
were asked to complete a short post-experiment questionnaire. Upon completion, all subjects were 
privately paid their earnings for the session. 
                                                          
11
 Note that, this way, both movers made exactly two decisions. Asking the seller to accept/reject an offer under 
investment if he had not previously invested (or vice versa) would be unintuitive and could lead to confusion. 
Furthermore, asking the seller to provide a full strategy would be burdensome and time consuming, and could potentially 
dilute his attention to the decision that truly mattered for his payoffs. 
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Figure 1. The game 
 
4.  Experiment 1 results 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of subject behavior in our three treatments. Since we 
used the strategy method to elicit the behavior of buyers (but not of sellers), we provide a detailed 
explanation of how the statistics were calculated. We use treatment X = 25, presented in the first 
column, as an example. Thirty-four subject pairs participated in this treatment. Fifteen out of thirty-
four sellers invested, yielding an investment rate of 44.1%. The thirty-four buyers offered, on 
average, 39.68 tokens, contingent upon their paired seller’s investment. The average premium price, 
Z, is equal to 39.68 – X = 14.68. The fifteen sellers who actually invested in Stage 1 learned about 
their paired buyers’ offers following investment, and thirteen of them accepted their respective offers, 
resulting in an average accepted offer of 44.00 tokens. Two of the fifteen sellers rejected their 
respective offers, resulting in a rejection rate of 13.3% and the rejected average offer of 28.00 tokens.  
The buyers offered, on average, 37.94 tokens contingent upon non-investment (again, 
averaged over all thirty-four of them due to the strategy method). Nineteen sellers who chose not to 
invest in Stage 1 learned about their paired buyers’ offers following non-investment, and eighteen of 
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them accepted their respective offers, resulting in an average accepted offer of 37.83 tokens. One of 
the nineteen sellers rejected his/her paired buyer’s offer of 20.00 tokens, resulting in a rejection rate 
of 5.3%. The distributions of offers following investment and non-investment are presented 
graphically in Figures 2a and 2b, respectively. 
Hypothesis 1 states that the offer following investment minus the outside option (Z) is 
decreasing in the outside option, that is, Z
25
 > Z
35
 > Z
65. The sixth row of the “Behavior following 
investment” panel in Table 1 presents the average value of Z for the three treatments. It is evident 
that Z decreases as the outside option increases. The Jonckheere-Terpstra non-parametric test 
confirms that this is indeed the case (p-value < 0.001).
12
 The non-parametric Mann-Whitney 
ranksum test, presented in the third row of Table 2, provides further support that Z
25
 is significantly 
higher than both Z
35
 and Z
65
 (p-value = 0.013 and < 0.001, respectively) and Z
35
 is significantly 
higher than Z
65 
(p-value < 0.001).
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Result 1: The buyer’s offer following the seller’s investment minus the outside option is decreasing 
in the size of the outside option. 
 
                                                          
12
 The Jonckheere-Terpstra test is a test for ordered hypotheses for an across-subject design that allows for a priori 
ordering of the populations from which the samples are drawn.  
13
 An interested reader might be curious about the statistical comparison of offers (pI’s) themselves. We find that offers 
following investment in treatment X = 25 are significantly lower than in X = 35 (p-value = 0.055) and in X = 65 (p-value 
< 0.001) and that offers in X = 35 are significantly lower than in X = 65 (p-value < 0.001). 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Treatment 
X = 25 
(34 obs.) 
X = 35 
(35 obs.) 
X = 65 
(32 obs.) 
 
Investment rate 15/34 (44.1%) 20/35 (57.1%) 27/32 (84.4%) 
 
 
Behavior following investment 
 
Average offer: pI 39.68 43.94 56.22 
Median offer  40 45 65 
Average premium price: 
Z = pI – X 
14.68 8.94 -8.78 
Average accepted offer 44.00 45.78 64.11 
Median accepted offer  45 45 66 
Rejection rate 2/15 (13.3%) 2/20 (10%) 9/27 (33.3%) 
Average rejected offer 28.00 39.00 46.11 
 
 
Behavior following non-investment 
 
Average offer: pNI 37.94 38.09 45.13 
Median offer  40 40 50 
Average accepted offer 37.83 40.08 28.00 
Median accepted offer  40 40 28 
Rejection rate  1/19 (5.3%) 2/15 (13.3%) 4/5 (80%) 
Average rejected offer 20.00 12.50 16.25 
The average offer is averaged over decisions of all buyers due to the strategy method. The average accepted offer 
following investment (non-investment) is averaged only over the accepted offers by the sellers who actually chose to 
invest (not to invest). The average rejected offer is calculated analogously. 
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Table 2. Statistical tests for treatment differences 
 Jonckheere-
Terpstra Three 
Sample Tests 
X = 25 v. X = 35 X = 25 v. X = 65 X = 35 v. X = 65 
Investment rate 
a - (0.339) (0.001) (0.018) 
Offers following 
investment (pI) 
- z = 1.92 (0.055) z = 4.89 (0.000) z = 4.58 (0.000) 
Offers following 
investment minus 
outside option (pI - 
X) 
(<0.001) z = -2.48 (0.013) z = -6.27 (0.000) z = -6.43 (0.000) 
Offers following 
non- investment 
(pNI) 
(0.030) z = -0.16 (0.870) z = 1.94 (0.053) z = 2.06 (0.040) 
a
 Fisher’s exact test; z-statistic for Mann-Whitney ranksum test; p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
Our second hypothesis concerns the effect that a foregone outside option has on the buyer’s 
offer, i.e., whether pNI increases as the outside option increases. We begin by testing the ordered 
hypothesis that pNI
25
 < pNI
35
 < pNI
65
. The Jonckheere-Terpstra test provides overall support for this 
hypothesis (p-value = 0.030).
14
 
Next, we investigate whether the relative change in the size of the outside option has any 
effect on pNI by performing pair-wise treatment comparisons. First, we compare offers following 
non-investment in X = 25 and X = 35 treatments and observe that the Mann-Whitney test, presented 
in the fourth row/first column of Table 2, finds no statistical difference between the two treatments 
(p-value = 0.870).  
Finally, we test whether the offer following non-investment is higher in treatment X = 65 
than in treatment X = 35, i.e., whether pNI
65 
> pNI
35
. The Mann-Whitney test presented in the fourth 
row/third column of Table 2 reports that the difference is statistically significant (p-value = 0.040).  
 
Result 2: The buyer’s offer following the seller’s non-investment is weakly increasing in the size of 
the outside option.  
 
 Our data thus provide some support that as the foregone outside option increases, the buyer’s 
conditional altruism increases, which in turn results in a higher offer being made to the seller. The 
                                                          
14
 The Jonckheere-Terpstra test’s alternative hypothesis is with all ordered pairs satisfying weak inequalities and at least 
one of them satisfying a strict inequality. Given the results from pair-wise comparisons we state Result 2 as weakly 
increasing. 
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evidence, however, is not as strong as with the premium price offered on top of the outside option.  
The finding by Cox, Servátka, and Vadovič (2017) that reciprocal responses to acts of commission 
are weaker than reciprocal responses to acts of omission, provides a plausible ex-post explanation for 
why this is the case. The distinction between acts of commission and acts of omission is based on 
whether the status quo is overturned or upheld by an agent’s action (Cox et al., 2008). While in our 
experiment we have not taken any steps to make the status quo particularly salient, one might argue 
that the status quo is the lack of investment, meaning that a person who does not invest commits an 
act of omission as opposed to investment, which would be considered an act of commission.
 15
 
 The observed pattern of offers following investment of offering close to half and close to X is 
consistent with the “deal-me-out” bargaining outcome (Binmore, Shaked, and  Sutton, 1989; 
Binmore, Proulx, Samuelson, and Swierzbinski, 1998). A testable implication of deal-me-out is 
whether offers are significantly higher following investment than non-investment when X = 65 but 
not when X = 25 and X = 35. We find that the offers following investment indeed are significantly 
higher than following non-investment when X = 65 (p-value = 0.032; Mann-Whitney ranksum test) 
and not when X = 25 (p-value = 0.549). However, we also find that the offers following investment 
indeed are significantly higher than following non-investment when X = 35 (p-value = 0.021), 
contrary to the deal-me-out prediction. 
                                                          
15
 To be exact, the Revealed Altruism theory developed by Cox et al. (2008) refers to the status quo opportunity set, 
which is the opportunity set available to the buyer in the absence of investment. 
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Figure 2. Within-subject comparisons of offers following investment and non-investment 
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We end this section by analyzing the seller’s return from investment in outside option. The 
seller’s maximum return from investment is max{X + Z, X} – F as he can accept the buyer’s offer or, 
if the offer is smaller than the outside option, take the outside option. Recall that the seller’s 
maximum return from non-investment is pNI. Let us define the maximum net return from investment, 
denoted by MNR, as MNR = max{X + Z, X} – F – pNI. Standard economic theory assuming self-
regarding preferences predicts that Z = pNI = 0, and hence MNR = X – F.  
Our experimental results, however, suggest that Z > 0 and pNI > 0, implying that MNR = X – 
F – (pNI – Z). Hence, MNR in the presence of other-regarding preferences is lower than MNR 
predicted by standard theory if pNI > Z. A quick look at the average values of Z and pNI presented in 
Table 1 reveals that pNI is indeed greater than Z for all treatments. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test for 
paired samples detects that this difference is statistically significant for all three within-treatment 
comparisons (p-value < 0.001 in all three cases). A lower MNR in the presence of other-regarding 
preferences suggests that the seller’s incentive to invest in outside option is not as high as predicted 
by standard theory. The seller may still choose to invest due to his own other-regarding preferences 
and risk aversion, and in fact, we do observe a significant fraction of our subjects investing in outside 
option in the experiment. At the same time, another significant fraction of our subjects chose not to 
invest in outside option. If a seller chooses not to invest in outside option, costly remedies such as 
vertical integration to prevent the inefficient activity may not be necessary, meaning that when the 
transaction cost economics approach is applied to the design of a governance structure, agents’ other 
regarding preferences, if relevant, should be considered.  
 
 
5. Experiment 2: The size of the outside option selected by the seller vs. randomly selected by 
the computer 
Experiment 2 addresses two limitations of Experiment 1: (i) When the outside option is fixed 
at X, the seller’s investment does not fully convey the seller’s opportunism towards the buyer 
because the seller does not choose the level of X. This means that the seller cannot be held 
responsible for the size of the outside option, but only for the act of investment itself. (ii) The 
presence of the outside option induced by investment changes the bargaining environment. The 
buyer’s offers following investment observed in Experiment 1 could therefore be affected by the 
seller’s opportunism and/or by the change in the environment.  
Experiment 2 remedies these issues by introducing two additional treatments. In the Choice 
treatment, the seller decides not only whether to invest in outside option, but in the case of 
investment also chooses the size of X. The available outside options are consistent with those in 
20 
 
Experiment 1; i.e. X = 25, 35, or 65. To control for the change in the bargaining environment caused 
by investment, in the Random treatment the seller makes no investment decision. Instead, the 
computer randomly chooses between no investment, investment resulting in X = 25, investment 
resulting in X = 35, or investment resulting in X = 65, all with equal probability. In both treatments, 
the seller’s cost of investment is fixed at F = 10 as in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 took place in the MGSM Experimental Economics Laboratory at the 
Macquarie Graduate School of Management in Sydney.
 16
 All procedures and parameterizations were 
analogous to Experiment 1 with one notable exception resulting from the new experimental design. 
Due to the use of the strategy method, each buyer was now making four offers. To minimize 
confusion, the four scenarios were presented on one screen as a list to match the explanation in the 
instructions (provided in Appendix C), rather than in random order on multiple screens. Importantly, 
in the Random treatment the sellers were informed about the scenario selected by the computer 
(independently for each seller) and the buyers knew this procedure. The buyers, however, were not 
informed about which scenario was selected at the time of making their offers. 
 
6. Experiment 2 results 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of subject behavior in Experiment 2. The introduction of 
the Choice treatment is motivated by the fact that the seller’s investment does not fully convey the 
seller’s opportunism in the basic setup of Experiment 1. Since the seller does not choose the level of 
X, he is only responsible for the opportunistic act of investment but not for the size of the outside 
option itself. With the caveat that the two experiments were conducted in different laboratories, we 
compare the offers following investment in the three individual treatments of Experiment 1 (the 
upper panel of Table 1) with those observed in the Choice treatment in X = 25, 35, and 65 scenarios 
(the upper panel of Table 3, columns 2-4). According to the Mann-Whitney test, there are no 
statistically significant differences in any of the three cases (p-value = 0.121, 0.115, and 0.241 for X 
= 25, 35, and 65 pairwise comparisons, respectively), suggesting that buyers’ behavior is not 
sensitive to whether the size of the outside option is endogenously chosen by the seller or 
exogenously imposed by the design. In other words, the seller’s opportunism is likely conveyed by 
the act of investment itself; the effect of selecting the size of X is marginal.
17
  
Note that offers following non-investment are conceptually different between our two 
experiments. The level of kindness of non-investment depends on the available unchosen alternatives. 
                                                          
16
 The exchange rate between the New Zealand dollar and the Australian dollar at the time of running Experiment 2 was 
1 NZD = 0.92 AUD. 
17
 Since Z is defined as pI – X, the comparison of Zs yields the same statistical result as the comparison of offers. 
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These alternatives vary by design; while in Experiment 1 the seller decides between investing to 
create a fixed outside option X and not investing, in Experiment 2 the seller also chooses the size of 
the outside option, making the offers following non-investment not directly comparable in the two 
situations. We therefore do not offer such comparison here. 
A within-experiment comparison of buyers’ behavior in the Choice and Random treatments 
allows us to gauge the relative importance of the change in the bargaining environment stemming 
from investment vis-à-vis the opportunistic behavior of the seller. In relation to our hypothesis H1, 
Experiment 2 data show that Z
25
 > Z
35
, Z
25
 > Z
65
, and Z
35
 > Z
65 
with all pairwise comparisons being 
highly statistically significant according to the Signed-Rank test (p-value  < 0.001 for all three 
comparisons in Choice; p-value = 0.0056 for Z
25
 > Z
35
 in Random and p-value  < 0.001 for the 
remaining two comparisons). Since the comparisons are within subjects, we cannot use the 
Jonckheere-Terpstra test for ordered hypotheses.  
Recall that in the Random treatment, the buyer does not perceive the investment as 
opportunistic because he knows that the decision is randomly determined by the computer and not by 
the seller. This implies that the observed relationship Z
25
 > Z
35
 > Z
65
 is not driven by the seller’s 
opportunistic behavior in the Random treatment but rather by the bargaining environment induced by 
investment. In contrast, the level of Z can be affected by the buyer’s perception of the seller’s 
opportunism in the Choice treatment. We therefore compare Zs in the Choice treatment (denoted by 
ZC) and Z in Random treatment (denoted by ZR). Our data show that ZC and ZR are not statistically 
different for X = 25 and 35 (p-value = 0.327 and 0.865, respectively; also reported in Table 4 as a 
comparison of offers between these two treatments), and that ZC is significantly greater than ZR for X 
= 65 (p-value = 0.022). This result suggests that the buyer views the seller’s investment as 
opportunistic when X = 65, but not when X = 25 or 35. In the two latter cases the size of the offers 
seems to be driven mostly by the change in the bargaining environment rather than opportunism per 
se. 
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Table 3. Subject behavior in Experiment 2 
 Non-investment Invest in X = 25 Invest in X = 35 Invest in X = 65 
 Choice treatment (n = 32)* 
Investment rate 1/32 1/32 3/32 28/32 
Average offer: pI 34.03 36.74 44.25 58.10 
Median offer  30 35 40 66 
Average premium 
price (Z = pI – X) 
n/a 11.74 9.26 -6.90 
Average accepted 
offer 
35 30 61.67 68.01 
Median accepted 
offer  
35 30 45 66 
Rejection rate 0/1 (0%) 0/1 (0%) 0/3 (0%) 10/26 (=38%) 
Average rejected 
offer 
n/a n/a n/a 37.88 
 Random treatment (n=34) 
Random 
investment rate  
8/34 5/34 8/34 13/34 
Average offer: pNI 26.32 35.76 43.09 64.79 
Median offer  22.5 35 40 70 
Average premium 
price (Z = pI – X) 
n/a 10.76 8.09 -0.21 
Average accepted 
offer 
28.50 36.00  42.75  69.18 
Median accepted 
offer  
20 35 40 70 
Rejection rate  2/8 (25%) 0/5 (0%) 0/8 (0%) 2/13 (%) 
Average rejected 
offer 
10.50 n/a  n/a 37 
* One buyer participated twice so we have excluded the second observation. Thus for buyers, n = 31. We have but kept 
the paired seller’s investment decision (invest in X = 65) that is still independent. For X = 65 the buyer 70 that was 
accepted by the seller. This acceptance is not included in the above summary as it is not independent of contamination. 
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Table 4. Statistical tests for the comparisons between the Choice and Random treatments 
 
Scenario pNI X = 25 X = 35 X = 65 
Mann-Whitney 
test 
z = -2.2251 
(0.024) 
z = -0.980 
(0.0327) 
z = -0.170 
(0.865) 
z = 2.290 
(0.022) 
z-statistic for Mann-Whitney ranksum test; p-values in parentheses. 
 
 
Result 3: The buyer views the seller’s investment as opportunistic when the outside option is high. 
 
One could also interpret the above result as the buyer viewing the seller’s non-investment as 
kind when X = 65, but not when X = 25 or 35. This interpretation is consistent with our Experiment 
1 finding that pNI
25
 < pNI
65 
and pNI
35
 < pNI
65 
but the lack of support for pNI
25
 < pNI
35
. 
The design of Experiment 2 does not, and is not meant to, permit a direct test of hypothesis 
H2. However, a within-experiment comparison of buyers’ offers following non-investment sheds 
additional light on the kindness of non-investment.  We find that such offers are statistically 
significantly higher in the Choice treatment than in the Random treatment (34.03 vs. 26.32; p-value 
= 0.024). As the buyers know that the seller could have invested in outside option (and chosen its 
size) but did not, this means that such non-investment is considered kind in the Choice treatment, but 
not in the Random treatment where the non-investment scenario happened to be randomly selected 
by the computer. 
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Figure 3. Within-subject comparisons of buyers’ offers in Experiment 2 
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
An agent often invests in an outside option in bilateral trade relationships to improve his 
bargaining position. In our setup, standard economic theory predicts that the buyer will capture the 
entire trade surplus by making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller, and, anticipating this, the seller 
will invest in the outside option as long as the net return on investment is positive. Investment in 
outside option is an example of ex-post opportunistic behavior. The transaction cost economics 
approach to the theory of the firm postulates that costly remedies such as vertical integration can 
prevent this type of inefficient activities. 
25 
 
In reality, agents often care for others to some degree rather than being completely self-
regarding as standard theory assumes. When agents behave in other-regarding ways, an altruistic 
buyer may offer a premium price Z on top of the outside option X. Our experimental findings 
support our conjecture that Z decreases as X increases, where the result is driven not only by changes 
in the bargaining environment but also by the buyer’s perception of the seller’s investment being 
opportunistic when X is large. We also conjecture that, following the seller’s non-investment 
decision, an altruistic buyer makes a positive offer pNI > 0, and pNI increases as the forgone outside 
option X increases. Our experimental findings support this conjecture when X is large, but do not 
when X is small. 
The seller’s return from investing in outside option in our experiment is lower than the 
amount predicted by standard theory, suggesting that the seller may refrain from investing in outside 
option. In fact, a significant fraction of our subjects chose not to invest in outside option. If a seller 
chooses not to invest in outside option, costly remedies such as vertical integration to prevent the 
inefficient activity may not be necessary. Our experimental findings therefore suggest that when the 
transaction cost economics approach is applied to the design of a governance structure, agents’ other 
regarding preferences, if relevant, should be taken into account.  
When one inspects the increase in average offers following investment across different 
outside options in both our experiments, this increase is not commensurate with the increase in the 
outside option. This observation is in line with the result of Anbarci and Feltovich (2013), who study 
the responsiveness to changes in bargaining position and find that an exogenous increase in the 
disagreement payoff leads to a smaller increase in the final payoff than predicted by the theories used 
for analyzing bargaining situations.
 
In our experiments, the outside option is created by the seller’s 
investment. A key idea of our paper is that the seller’s investment in the outside option decreases the 
buyer’s (conditional) altruism if the buyer views the investment as opportunistic. In contrast, in 
Anbarci and Feltovich’s setup the disagreement payoffs are established by the design to test the 
predictions of standard bargaining theories. Anbarci and Feltovich find that their experimental results 
do not support these predictions and then illustrate that a model of other-regarding preferences can 
explain their main experimental results, providing further evidence that other-regarding preferences 
play an important role in bargaining scenarios with disagreement payoffs/outside options, that our 
experiments are also an example of. 
We conclude the paper by pointing out several directions for future research. First, as 
discussed in the previous section, one can study an extension of our setup in which the seller and the 
buyer have an option of writing a contract or vertically integrating themselves into a single entity to 
prevent ex-post opportunism. Such experimental studies would yield useful implications for roles 
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that other-regarding behavior can play in the design of governance structures.
18
 Second, regarding 
real-world applicability in the contexts of large firms, our experimental design is applicable to 
bilateral trade relationships between managers representing different firms as stated in Introduction. 
At the same time, it is important to note that some bilateral-trade decisions are made collectively by 
groups, such as the board or the senior management team rather than individually by a single 
manager. While in laboratory experiments it is possible to use groups as decision-makers as first 
approximations, it is not obvious how these groups are supposed to make decisions, whether this is 
done by unanimous or majority voting, selecting a leader who has the final word, etc. We view this 
as a fruitful avenue for future experimental research on firms’ governance structures and resulting 
behavior. Third, it is important to test the robustness of experimental findings with respect to 
changes in the environment that one might encounter in everyday life, for example, removing 
common knowledge of the outside option or introducing an outside option (or a possibility of 
investment in outside option) also for the buyer. Fourth, while we mostly focused on other-regarding 
preferences, there could be other motivations present in subject behavior such as fear of rejection. 
Separating them out à la Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton (1994), Cox (2004), or Servátka 
(2009) will yield a deeper understanding of the transmission mechanism through which the 
experienced opportunism affects behavior. Fifth, carefully designed field experiments to address our 
research questions would strengthen relevance of the present paper's findings to actual firms and 
businesses.   
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 See, for example, Morita and Servátka (2013, 2016) who experimentally investigate relationships between identity and 
firm boundaries under similar strategic interactions. 
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Appendix A: Theoretical Framework 
 
This supplementary section derives conjectures based on the logic of the Revealed Altruism 
theory (Cox et al., 2008). We analyze the interaction between a seller and a buyer presented in 
Introduction. As a benchmark, consider the case in which the seller has no option to invest in the 
outside option. To split the gain G, an altruistic/inequality-averse buyer would offer a strictly 
positive price, even if the seller accepts any non-negative offer p ≥ 0. The seller, however, may in 
fact reject low-price offers because of his own inequality aversion. This would work in the direction 
of further increasing the buyer’s offer, because by doing so, the buyer can reduce the probability of 
rejection. Let us now introduce the seller’s option to invest in the outside option. If the seller 
invested to establish the outside option of X, the buyer may offer more than X for reasons analogous 
to the reasons for a strictly positive price offered in the benchmark case. Recall that pI  X + Z 
denotes the buyer’s offer following the seller’s investment, where Z (≥ 0) is a premium price on top 
of the outside option X resulting from buyer’s altruistic preferences, and that pNI denotes the buyer’s 
offer when the seller did not invest in Stage 1. 
The focus of our experiment is the interaction of opportunism with other-regarding behavior. 
The Revealed Altruism theory (Cox et al., 2008) has been quite successful in predicting outcomes in 
various experimental settings testing for the presence and nature of other-regarding behavior and has 
recently received increased attention in the related literature. We derive our conjectures based on the 
logic of the theory.  
The key elements of the theory are a partial ordering of opportunity sets, a partial ordering of 
preferences, and two axioms about reciprocity. The partial ordering of opportunity sets is defined as 
follows. Let b denote the buyer’s money payoff and let s denote the seller’s money payoff. Let 
*
Hb  
denote the buyer’s maximum money payoff in opportunity set H  and let
*
Hs  denote the seller’s 
maximum money payoff in opportunity set H . Opportunity set G  is ‘more generous than’ 
opportunity set F  for the buyer if: (a)  ; and (b)  . In the original version of 
the theory, our three treatments include the same opportunity sets, [0, 100], for the buyer, regardless 
of whether or not the seller choses to invest in the outside option. To see this, suppose that the seller 
decides to invest in the outside option. Our setup does not rule out the possibility that the buyer 
offers p = 0 and the seller accepts the offer instead of rejecting it and receiving the outside option X. 
Hence, the buyer’s maximum money payoff is 100, regardless of the seller’s investment decision.  
We modify the definition of the opportunity set based on the idea that the seller’s investment 
imposes de facto restrictions on the buyer’s opportunity set. Let  0,100G  denote the buyer’s 
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opportunity set if the seller chooses not to invest. If the seller decides to invest in the outside option, 
the buyer thinks that he must offer at least p = X, anticipating that any offer p < X would be rejected 
by the seller. This, in turn, de facto restricts the buyer’s opportunity set to be FX = [0, 100 – X]. 
According to our modified definition, opportunity set G is more generous for the buyer than 
opportunity set FX for all X > 0, meaning that investment in the outside option is less generous. By 
the same logic, the higher the outside option, the less generous the investment in it is. That is, for any 
X and X’, such that ,  is ‘more generous than’ . 
 The partial ordering of preferences is defined as follows. The buyer’s willingness to pay to 
increase the seller’s dollar payoff can depend on the absolute and relative amounts of their respective 
payoffs. Two different preference orderings, A and B, over allocations of dollar payoffs might 
represent the preferences of two different buyers or the preferences of the same buyer in two 
different situations. For a given domain, preference ordering A is ‘more altruistic than’ preference 
ordering B if the buyer’s willingness to pay to increase the seller’s payoff in situation A is greater 
than or equal to his willingness to pay in situation B.
 19
  
The Revealed Altruism theory postulates that an individual’s preferences can become more 
or less altruistic depending on the choices of another agent. Axiom R (for reciprocity) states that if 
the seller provides a more (less) generous opportunity set to the buyer, then the buyer’s preferences 
will become more (less) altruistic towards the seller.
20
 In our setup, when the seller invests in the 
outside option, he provides a less generous opportunity set to the buyer (FX = [0, 100 – X] instead of 
 0,100G  ), and hence the buyer’s preferences will become less altruistic. The buyer’s willingness 
to pay to increase the seller’s payoff is then smaller following the seller’s investment than following 
non-investment. Furthermore, notice that the buyer’s opportunity set following investment, FX = [0, 
100 – X], becomes less generous as the outside option X increases. Given this, we postulate that the 
higher the outside option, the buyer offers a lower premium price following the seller’s investment, 
meaning that Z is decreasing in X. This is our first conjecture. 
 Our second conjecture concerns the seller’s non-investment decision. When the seller 
chooses not to invest in the outside option, he provides a more generous opportunity set 
(  0,100G  instead of FX = [0, 100 – X]) to the buyer, and hence the buyer’s preferences will 
become more altruistic. Since FX = [0, 100 – X] becomes increasingly less generous as X increases, 
                                                          
19
 The formal definitions of the two partial orderings and the two axioms can be found in Cox et al. (2008), sections 2- 4. 
20
 Axiom S (for the status quo) then states that the buyer’s altruistic response will be stronger if the seller overturns the 
status quo budget set than when the status quo is upheld, making a distinction between acts of commission and omission. 
See Cox et al. (2017) for a detailed discussion of implications of Axiom S. 
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we postulate that the higher the foregone outside option, the more generous non-investment is.
21
 This, 
in turn, will make the buyer’s preferences more altruistic, meaning that he will offer a higher pNI as 
X increases. 
 
 
                                                          
21
 A similar argument is presented in Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) and Cox, Servátka, and Vadovič (2010) with 
respect to behavior in the lost wallet game and in Brandts, Güth, and Stiehler (2006) in a three-player, pie-sharing game. 
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Appendix B: EXPERIMENT 1 INSTRUCTIONS (Treatment X = 25) 
 
No Talking Allowed 
Thank you for coming.  The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in a 
particular situation.  From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any 
nature with other participants is prohibited.  If you violate this rule we will have to exclude you from 
the experiment and from all payments.  If you have a question after we finish reading the instructions, 
please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
Earnings 
Every participant will get $5 as a show up fee and, in addition, have the opportunity to earn money in 
the experiment. Your final experimental earnings will depend on your decisions and on the decisions 
of others.  The earnings will be denoted in experimental currency referred to as tokens.  Upon 
completion of the experiment, all tokens will be exchanged into dollars using the following exchange 
rate: 1 token = $0.30.  Notice that the more tokens you earn, the more dollars you will receive.  All 
the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
Anonymity  
You will be randomly paired with another person.   No one will learn the identity of the person (s)he is 
paired with.  Because your decision is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your 
earnings either during or after the experiment. 
 
Pairing and Roles 
Within each pair, one person is going to be randomly assigned to be the First Mover and the other 
person to be the Second Mover. 100 tokens are made available to be split between the First and the 
Second Mover. The 100 tokens are split only if the First Mover accepts the Second Mover’s offer but 
the 100 tokens disappear if the First Mover rejects. The First Mover starts the experiment with 10 
tokens.  The Second Mover starts the experiment with 0 tokens.  The decisions are divided into three 
stages: 
 
Stage 1: The First Mover’s Investment Decision 
The First Mover decides whether or not to invest his/her 10 tokens in order to create an outside option of 
25 tokens for himself/herself in case (s)he rejects the Second Mover’s offer which will be made in the 
next stage. 
 If the First Mover invests, then his/her outside option is 25 tokens. 
 If the First Mover does not invest, then his/her outside option is 0 tokens. (However, the First 
Mover gets to keep the 10 tokens.) 
 
Stage 2: The Second Mover’s Offer 
The Second Mover decides how much out of 100 tokens to offer to the First Mover. The Second Mover 
keeps the remainder only if the First Mover accepts the offer. 
 
34 
 
The Second Mover is not yet notified of the First Mover’s investment decision. Hence each Second 
Mover makes a decision for both of the two possible First Mover’s decisions: 
 If the First Mover has invested and his/her outside option is 25 tokens. 
 If the First Mover has not invested and his/her outside option is 0 tokens. 
 
Note that the First Mover’s decision will determine which decision of the Second Mover will be 
relevant.  Therefore, please think about your decisions carefully. 
 
Stage 3: The First Mover’s Acceptance/Rejection 
The First Mover learns about the offer, and either accepts it or rejects it. 
 
 If the First Mover accepts the Second Mover’s offer, the 100 tokens is split according to the 
offer. The outside option is irrelevant in this case. 
 If the First Mover rejects the Second Mover’s offer, the Second Mover receives 0 tokens. The 
First Mover receives the outside option of 25 tokens if (s)he invested at Stage 1, and receives 0 
tokens if (s)he did not invest at Stage 1 (in which case (s)he keeps the original 10 tokens). 
 
Payment of Experimental Earnings 
Once all participants have made their decisions, you will be shown a summary of your payoffs.  
Then you will be asked one by one to approach the experimenter in the room in the back of the lab 
for the payment of your experimental earnings. Are there any questions? 
 
 
Practice Questions  
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. If the First Mover invests his/her 10 tokens and the Second Mover offers 40 tokens which is 
accepted by the First Mover, what are the First Mover’s final earnings? …………  
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? …………..  
 
2.  If the First Mover invests his/her 10 tokens and the Second Mover offers 40 which is rejected by 
the First Mover, what are the First Mover’s final earnings? …………  
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? …………..  
 
3. If the First Mover does not invest his/her 10 tokens and the Second Mover offers 40 tokens which 
is accepted by the First Mover, what are the First Mover’s final earnings (including the starting 10 
tokens)? …………  
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? …………..  
 
4. If the First Mover does not invest his/her 10 tokens and the Second Mover offers 40 which is 
rejected by the First Mover, what are the First Mover’s final earnings? (including the starting 10 
tokens) …………  
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? ………….. 
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Appendix B 
EXPERIMENT 2 INSTRUCTIONS (Choice Treatment) 
No Talking Allowed 
Thank you for coming.  The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in a 
particular situation.  From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any 
nature with other participants is prohibited.  If you violate this rule we will have to exclude you from 
the experiment and from all payments.  If you have a question after we finish reading the instructions, 
please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
Earnings 
Every participant will get $5 as a show up fee and, in addition, have the opportunity to earn money in 
the experiment. Your final experimental earnings will depend on your decisions and on the decisions 
of others.  The earnings will be denoted in experimental currency referred to as tokens.  Upon 
completion of the experiment, all tokens will be exchanged into dollars using the following exchange 
rate: 1 token = $0.30.  Notice that the more tokens you earn, the more dollars you will receive.  All 
the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
Anonymity  
You will be randomly paired with another person.   No one will learn the identity of the person (s)he is 
paired with.  Because your decision is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your 
earnings either during or after the experiment. 
 
Pairing and Roles 
Within each pair, one person is going to be randomly assigned to be the First Mover and the other 
person to be the Second Mover. 100 tokens are made available to be split between the First and the 
Second Mover. The 100 tokens are split only if the First Mover accepts the Second Mover’s offer but 
the 100 tokens disappear if the First Mover rejects. The First Mover starts the experiment with 10 
tokens.  The Second Mover starts the experiment with 0 tokens.  The decisions are divided into three 
stages: 
 
Stage 1: The First Mover’s Investment Decision and the Size of the Outside Option 
The First Mover decides whether or not to invest his/her 10 tokens to create an outside option for 
himself/herself. The outside option will become relevant in case (s)he rejects the Second Mover’s offer 
that will be made in the next stage. In the case of investment, the First Mover chooses the size of the 
outside option to be 25, 35, or 65 tokens.  
 
 If the First Mover invests, then his/her outside option is 25, 35, or 65 tokens, depending on the 
size (s)he has chosen. 
 If the First Mover does not invest, then his/her outside option is 0 tokens. (However, the First 
Mover gets to keep the 10 tokens.) 
 
Stage 2: The Second Mover’s Offer 
The Second Mover decides how much out of 100 tokens to offer to the First Mover. The Second Mover 
keeps the remainder only if the First Mover accepts the offer. 
 
The Second Mover is not yet notified of the First Mover’s investment decision. Hence each Second 
Mover makes a decision for all four possible First Mover’s decisions: 
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 If the First Mover has not invested and his/her outside option is 0 tokens. 
 If the First Mover has invested and chose the 25 tokens outside option. 
 If the First Mover has invested and chose the 35 tokens outside option. 
 If the First Mover has invested and chose the 65 tokens outside option. 
 
Note that the First Mover’s decision will determine which decision of the Second Mover will be 
relevant.  Therefore, please think about your decisions carefully. 
 
Stage 3: The First Mover’s Acceptance/Rejection 
The First Mover learns about the offer, and either accepts it or rejects it. 
 
 If the First Mover accepts the Second Mover’s offer, the 100 tokens is split according to the 
offer. The outside option is irrelevant in this case. 
 If the First Mover rejects the Second Mover’s offer, the Second Mover receives 0 tokens. The 
First Mover receives the chosen outside option if (s)he invested at Stage 1, and receives 0 tokens 
if (s)he did not invest at Stage 1 (in which case (s)he keeps the original 10 tokens). 
 
Payment of Experimental Earnings 
Once all participants have made their decisions, you will be shown a summary of your payoffs.  
Then you will be asked one by one to approach the experimenter in the room in the back of the lab 
for the payment of your experimental earnings. Are there any questions? 
 
 
Practice Questions  
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. If the First Mover invests his/her 10 tokens, chooses an outside option of 25 and the Second 
Mover offers 40 tokens which is accepted by the First Mover, what are the First Mover’s final 
earnings? ………… 
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? ………….. 
 
2. If the First Mover invests his/her 10 tokens, chooses an outside option of 65 and the Second 
Mover offers 40 tokens which is accepted by the First Mover, what are the First Mover’s final 
earnings? …………  
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? …………..  
 
3.  If the First Mover invests his/her 10 tokens, chooses an outside option of 35 and the Second 
Mover offers 40 which is rejected by the First Mover, what are the First Mover’s final earnings? 
…………  
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? ………….. 
 
4.  If the First Mover invests his/her 10 tokens, chooses an outside option of 65 and the Second 
Mover offers 40 which is rejected by the First Mover, what are the First Mover’s final earnings? 
…………  
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? …………..  
 
5. If the First Mover does not invest his/her 10 tokens and the Second Mover offers 40 tokens which 
is accepted by the First Mover, what are the First Mover’s final earnings (including the starting 10 
tokens)? …………  
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? ………….. 
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6. If the First Mover does not invest his/her 10 tokens and the Second Mover offers 40 which is 
rejected by the First Mover, what are the First Mover’s final earnings? (including the starting 10 
tokens) ………… 
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? ………….. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 INSTRUCTIONS (Random Treatment) 
No Talking Allowed 
Thank you for coming.  The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in a 
particular situation.  From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any 
nature with other participants is prohibited.  If you violate this rule we will have to exclude you from 
the experiment and from all payments.  If you have a question after we finish reading the instructions, 
please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
Earnings 
Every participant will get $5 as a show up fee and, in addition, have the opportunity to earn money in 
the experiment. Your final experimental earnings will depend on your decisions and on the decisions 
of others.  The earnings will be denoted in experimental currency referred to as tokens.  Upon 
completion of the experiment, all tokens will be exchanged into dollars using the following exchange 
rate: 1 token = $0.30.  Notice that the more tokens you earn, the more dollars you will receive.  All 
the money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
Anonymity  
You will be randomly paired with another person.   No one will learn the identity of the person (s)he is 
paired with.  Because your decision is private, we ask that you do not tell anyone your decision or your 
earnings either during or after the experiment. 
 
Pairing and Roles 
Within each pair, one person is going to be randomly assigned to be the First Mover and the other 
person to be the Second Mover. 100 tokens are made available to be split between the First and the 
Second Mover. The 100 tokens are split only if the First Mover accepts the Second Mover’s offer but 
the 100 tokens disappear if the First Mover rejects. The First Mover starts the experiment with 10 
tokens.  The Second Mover starts the experiment with 0 tokens.  The decisions are divided into three 
stages: 
 
Stage 1: The Investment Decision and the Size of the Outside Option Selected Randomly by the 
Computer 
The computer randomly decides whether or not the First Mover’s 10 tokens will be invested to create an 
outside option for the First Mover. The outside option will become relevant in case the First Mover 
rejects the Second Mover’s offer that will be made in the next stage. In the case of investment, the 
computer randomly selects the size of the outside option to be 25, 35, or 65 tokens.  
 
 If the computer’s invests, then the First Mover’s outside option is 25, 35, or 65 tokens, 
depending on the randomly selected size. Each of the three outside options has a 25% chance to 
be selected. 
 If the computer does not invest (which occurs with the remaining 25% chance), then the First 
Mover’s outside option is 0 tokens. (However, the First Mover gets to keep the 10 tokens.) 
 
Note that the First Mover has no decision to make in Stage 1.  
 
Stage 2: The Second Mover’s Offer 
The Second Mover decides how much out of 100 tokens to offer to the First Mover. The Second Mover 
keeps the remainder only if the First Mover accepts the offer. 
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The Second Mover is not yet notified of the computer’s investment decision. Hence each Second 
Mover makes a decision for all of the four possible computer’s decisions: 
 
 If the computer has not invested and the First Mover’s outside option is 0 tokens. 
 If the computer has invested and the First Mover’s outside option is 25 tokens. 
 If the computer has invested and the First Mover’s outside option is 35 tokens. 
 If the computer has invested and the First Mover’s outside option is 65 tokens. 
 
Note that the computer’s random decision will determine which decision of the Second Mover will be 
relevant. Therefore, please think about your decisions carefully. 
 
Stage 3: The First Mover’s Acceptance/Rejection 
The First Mover learns about the offer, and either accepts it or rejects it. 
 
 If the First Mover accepts the Second Mover’s offer, the 100 tokens is split according to the 
offer. The outside option is irrelevant in this case. 
 If the First Mover rejects the Second Mover’s offer, the Second Mover receives 0 tokens. The 
First Mover receives the randomly selected outside option if the computer invested at Stage 1, 
and receives 0 tokens if the computer did not invest at Stage 1 (in which case the First Mover 
keeps the original 10 tokens). 
 
Payment of Experimental Earnings 
Once all participants have made their decisions, you will be shown a summary of your payoffs.  
Then you will be asked one by one to approach the experimenter in the room in the back of the lab 
for the payment of your experimental earnings. Are there any questions? 
 
 
 
Practice Questions  
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. If the computer invests the First Mover’s 10 tokens, an outside option of 25 is randomly selected 
and the Second Mover offers 40 tokens which is accepted by the First Mover, what are the First 
Mover’s final earnings? …………  
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? …………..  
 
2. If the computer invests the First Mover’s 10 tokens, an outside option of 65 is randomly selected 
and the Second Mover offers 40 tokens which is accepted by the First Mover, what are the First 
Mover’s final earnings? …………  
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? …………..  
 
3.  If the computer invests the First Mover’s 10 tokens, an outside option of 35 is randomly selected 
and the Second Mover offers 40 which is rejected by the First Mover, what are the First Mover’s 
final earnings? …………  
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? ………….. 
 
4.  If the computer invests the First Mover’s 10 tokens, an outside option of 65 is randomly selected 
and the Second Mover offers 40 which is rejected by the First Mover, what are the First Mover’s 
final earnings? …………  
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? …………..  
40 
 
 
5. If the computer does not invest the First Mover’s 10 tokens and the Second Mover offers 40 
tokens which is accepted by the First Mover, what are the First Mover’s final earnings (including the 
starting 10 tokens)? …………  
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? …………..  
 
6. If the computer does not invest the First Mover’s 10 tokens and the Second Mover offers 40 which 
is rejected by the First Mover, what are the First Mover’s final earnings? (including the starting 10 
tokens) …………  
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? …………..  
 
